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Abstract Theories of ethical decision making assume it
is a process that is special, or different in some regard, from
typical individual decision making. Empirical results of the
most widely known theories in the field of business ethics
contain numerous inconsistencies and contradictions. In an
attempt to assess why we continue to lack understanding of
how individuals make ethical decisions at work, an
inductive study of ethical decision making was conducted.
The results of this preliminary study suggest that ethical
decision making might not be meaningfully ‘‘special’’ or
different from other decision making processes. The
implications of this research are potentially significant in
that they challenge the fundamental assumption of existing
ethical decision making research. This research could serve
as an impetus for further examination of whether ethical
decision making is meaningfully different from other
decision making processes. Such studies could create new
directions for the field of business ethics.
Keywords Business ethics  Ethical decision making 
Decision making  Inductive study  Qualitative research
Ethical decision making is an important field of study
that—for more than two decades—has captured the interest
of many prominent scholars at the intersection of social
issues, business ethics, psychology, and philosophy. Sep-
arately and together they have struggled to advance our
understanding of human decision making and behavior.
Why do people make the choices they do? How do they
reason through challenging ethical decisions? Are they
influenced by identifiable internal or external factors?
Answers to such questions are viewed as important
because, the more we learn about ethical decision making,
the more we are potentially able to influence positive
ethical behavior and assist in restoring the ‘‘public trust’’
(Abdolmohammadi and Baker 2008, p. 58). The need to
influence responsible behavior has becoming increasingly
critical to deal with ‘‘knotty ethical challenges’’ (Weber
and Wasieleski 2001, p. 79) and ‘‘high impact scandals’’
(Trevin˜o et al. 2006, p. 951) that have tainted the early
years of this millennium. Perhaps most notable among
these remains the recent sub-prime mortgage and related
financial crisis; although, it began in the United States, it
has caused a ripple effect across the entire globe.
The presence of repeated incidents of such egregious
behavior continues to call into question what we really know
about ethical decision making, particularly in the absence of
clear scholarly consensus. While good deductive theories
have been developed, existing models are somewhat limited
and concepts have been operationalized differently by
scholars. This has led to empirical results that are mixed—
leading to the possible conclusion that we do not have a
consistent intellectual perspective about how people make
ethical decisions. We suggest that this could result from a
flawed assumption that ethical decision making is different
from other types of decision making. Maybe it is not.
The purpose of this article is to examine that assumption
as it frames existing empirical research in the field of
ethical decision making. We are not, in this article,
addressing the normative philosophical scholarship on this
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issue; our focus lies on the empirical studies designed to
test existing theories. As different as they are, most existing
theories posit that ethical decision making involves a pro-
cess that is special—or different, in some regard—from
typical individual decision making. We did not set out to
challenge this, but, simply, to ask the question: Do indi-
viduals make ethical decisions differently from other
decisions they make? If there is something meaningfully
different about ethical decision making—if it is ‘‘spe-
cial’’—then the research in the field of ethical decision
making needs to be fortified. If, however, there is not a
meaningful difference, by treating it as special, we may be
impoverishing our understanding of ethical decision mak-
ing of knowledge gained from studying individual decision
making in general.
Research Question
Research on ethical decision making primarily focuses on
wrongdoing in the form of deviance (Warren 2003),
counterproductive behavior (Martinko et al. 2002), and
misconduct (Vardi 2001). The implicit correlative of the
presence of this sort of behavior is its absence. The
research therefore considers negative and not negative
behavior, but leaves a hole with regard to proactively
positive behavior. Other scholars have similarly noted the
glaring absence of this sort, particularly in the field of
positive psychology.
For example, Cameron et al. (2003) suggested that virtues
that have value in organizations can often lead to proactively
positive behavior, such as gratitude, resiliency, authenticity,
and courage. And, while emphasizing the value of positive
behavior versus negative, most of this work has been theo-
retical in nature. This area of study nevertheless ‘‘has much
to offer the study of ethical decision making and ethical
behavior’’ (Trevin˜o et al. 2006, p. 975). It is possible that not
addressing this category of behavior has contributed toward
distorting findings and perpetuating potentially flawed
assumptions in ethical decision making.
Discussions of ethical decision making involve both
descriptive ethics and normative ethics (e.g., O’Fallon and
Butterfield 2005). Where social scientists describe how
people do behave, philosophers articulate how they ought
to behave, and both approaches are integral to the field. In a
recent review of the field, Trevin˜o et al. (2006) refer to
ethical decision making as ‘‘behavioral ethics,’’ which they
describe as ‘‘being primarily concerned with explaining
individual behavior that occurs in the context of larger
social prescriptions’’ (p. 952). While their focus lies on
describing behavior, it is important to keep in mind that
behavior is influenced by social and moral prescriptions.
The two ‘‘realms’’ of business ethics—descriptive ethics
and normative ethics—thus apply in tandem (e.g., O’Fallon
and Butterfield 2005).
In a related perspective regarding this connectedness
Freeman (1994) asserts that one of the fundamental hand-
icaps of business is its misguided tendency to view ethics
and business as if they can be treated as separate or sepa-
rate-able. He argues that business cannot and should not be
disentangled from ethics and viewed in isolation any more
than operations or marketing can or should be considered
without regard for the products or services being invento-
ried or sold. Paine (2004) argued along similar lines in
suggesting the economics should not be paramount to
ethics in business; if anything, ethics should be paramount
to economics. These scholars do not treat ethical decision
making as different, but provide guidance for all types of
decision making. Their assumption is that all types of
decisions have moral dimensions and moral consequences.
This perspective has more recently been argued by Crary
(2007) as she suggests that all language is moral language.
Similar logic can be applied to the field of ethical
decision making or behavioral ethics: the empirical and
philosophical streams of research are—or should be—
intertwined. As Trevin˜o and Weaver (1994) pointed out,
numerous points of ‘‘collision’’ exist. The answer lies not in
ignoring these collisions, but in confronting them head on.
The consequence of viewing descriptive and normative
ethics as separate is that empirical studies have moved for-
ward with the assumption that ethical decision making is
different—i.e., separate—from other types of decision
making without being compelled to challenge that
assumption.
Our argument is not that existing research is incorrect,
but that in focusing on narrow subsets (i.e., wrongdoing,
unethical decisions), we have impoverished our under-
standing of ethical decision making and possibly distorted
it. Our purpose is to challenge us to think more critically
about the field of ethical decision making as it exists and
how it can and should move forward. Instead merely of
building upon what we have started perhaps it is time to
take a step back to ask questions that we assumed in the
beginning, for the answers to such questions might hold the
key to why various inconsistencies and contradictions
appear to exist. It could be that we have been asking the
wrong question. The question we have been asking is,
‘‘How is ethical decision making different?’’ Perhaps the
more appropriate research question is, ‘‘Is ethical decision
making different?’’
Ethical Decision Making
The field of ethical decision making is currently charac-
terized by thousands of articles in journals spanning
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multiple disciplines, including psychology, sociology,
philosophy, economics, and management. Scholars are
constantly pushing the limits of our understanding by
overcoming traditional barriers. Recent research has even
included partnerships with scientists and medical scholars.
Robertson and colleagues, for example, have experimented
with magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology in
search of visible indicators of ethical decision making
(Robertson et al. 2007).
The field of ethical decision making continues to evolve.
While the sheer number of relevant publications renders
any examination of the field of ethical decision making
very difficult, it is helpful to identify specific areas of study
within the general category of ethical decision making
before describing our study. Below, we will briefly sum-
marize some of the more notable areas of research in the
field. The review is not intended to be comprehensive,
rather to highlight the major developments in business
ethics research.
Moral Reasoning
Moral reasoning refers to the cognitive process of deter-
mining how a person reasons about ethical situations. The
theory of cognitive moral judgment initiated by Kohlberg
(1969) has been widely adopted in the field of ethical
decision making. Kohlberg’s model suggested that indi-
viduals progress through certain stages of moral develop-
ment regarding how they reason through moral problems
using a cognitive framework that develops as the individual
matures (Kohlberg 1969, 1981; Colby and Kohlberg 1987).
He relied on Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice for the nor-
mative philosophical grounding for the validity of the later
stages of reasoning in his framework. Justice, defined by
Rawls as ‘‘fairness,’’ was the central moral principle of
higher levels of moral reasoning according to Kohlberg.
Rest followed the work of Kohlberg, and is one of the
most prominent scholars associated with study of moral
reasoning. Like Kohlberg, Rest used Rawls’ principles of
justice as the basis for the normative foundation of his
model, but he developed a slightly different conceptualiza-
tion of the stage progression for an individual’s cognitive
moral development. As a result, he developed a widely used
instrument, called the Defining Issues Test (known as the
DIT) to measure the moral reasoning of individuals (Rest
1979). In later study, Rest and his colleagues expanded on
their study in moral reasoning to develop a model of moral or
ethical decision making that links moral reasoning with
moral behavior (Rest et al. 1986). The model consists of four
stages: moral awareness (recognizing the moral/ethical
issue); moral evaluation (reasoning or analyzing through the
dilemma or issue); moral intention (deciding to act on the
decision); and moral behavior (the act itself). This research
has led to numerous examinations of linkages between the
different stages, including the investigation of ethical sen-
sitivity, a concept suggested to represent an individual’s
ability to recognize an issue or situation as having moral
content (Bebeau et al. 1985; Sparks and Hunt 1998).
The prominent study of Gilligan (1982) exemplifies
another significant evolution in moral reasoning research.
She objected specifically to Kohlberg’s reliance on Rawls’
principles of justice, which she posited caused females to
be evaluated as morally inferior to males since many
females do not rely on those principles in making deci-
sions. She identified what she called an ‘‘ethic of care,’’
capturing moral reasoning based on relationships, in con-
trast with the more hierarchical ‘‘ethic of justice,’’ tradi-
tionally assumed to ground moral reasoning. Although,
Gilligan initially correlated ethics with gender, subsequent
research has challenged this hypothesis and now suggests
that, while different types of moral reasoning exist, they are
not gender dependent (Derry 1989; Ambrose and Schminke
1999; Weber and Wasieleski 2001).
The study of Trevin˜o helped move the examination of
moral reasoning into the context of business. Trevin˜o
(1986) proposed a person–situation interactionist model
that suggested that ethical decision making is a function of
the moral reasoning level of an individual moderated by the
immediate job context and the individual’s locus of con-
trol. Empirical research stemming from this theoretical
perspective has incorporated a variety of individual and
situational factors. Results are nevertheless mixed regard-
ing the exact effect of these factors on how individuals
reason about moral problems (Weber 1990; Elm and Nic-
hols 1993; Weber and Wasieleski 2001). Weber and
Wasieleski (2001), for example, found that only ‘‘some’’
situation factors might influence moral reasoning.
Individual demographic (‘‘identity’’) factors have also
been considered in terms of moral reasoning. Such studies
have also produced somewhat contradictory results. Con-
trary to previous research, Elm and Nichols (1993) found a
negative correlation between age and moral reasoning in
the organizations they studied. Weber and Wasieleski
(2001) and Glover et al. (1997) found that no correlation
existed between age and moral reasoning.
The field of study is much larger than the handful of
articles named here; but the selection of articles reflects the
sorts of existing contradictions that generally populate the
study of moral reasoning and ethical decision making.
Social Intuitionist Moral Reasoning
Recent study in cognitive psychology on moral judgment has
shifted perspectives on how individuals make ethical or
moral decisions. For example, the influential study of Haidt
in developing an opposing view of the typical rationalist
Ethical Decision Making
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model of moral reasoning has suggested significantly dif-
ferent directions for the field of ethical decision making. His
model of social intuitionist moral judgment suggests that
ethical decisions are made primarily by rapid intuitions
rather than by reasoning through to a solution. In fact, he
argues that reasoning about the moral choice takes place after
the decision has already been made by using moral intuitions
(Haidt 2001). This suggests that individuals may make
choices about ethical issues in a more unconscious manner
than the more conscious, controlled steps of moral reasoning
presented in Kohlberg’s more rationalist model of moral
judgment. This model also posits that emotions and social
interactions play a role in the process of reaching an ethical
choice.
Interestingly, it is now widely accepted in cognitive
psychology that two processing systems are used when
individuals make judgments or solve problems. The use of
these dual process models suggest that reasoning and
intuition are both at play in the process (Chaiken and Trope
1999), and that moral judgments are similar to other types
of judgments in which much of the process is intuitive
(Haidt 2001; Gibbs 1991).
Moral Intensity
Another area of study within ethical decision making is
moral intensity. Moral intensity refers to ‘‘characteristics
of the ethical issue that compel the decision maker to
employ ethical reasoning [emphasis added]’’ (McMahon
and Harvey 2006, p. 337). Rest’s and Trevin˜o’s study
provided a foundation for Jones’ (1991) framework for
moral intensity, which targets characteristics of the ethical
issue rather than the individual or situational characteris-
tics. According to Jones’ model, moral intensity is com-
prised of six dimensions: magnitude of consequences,
social consensus, proximity, probability of effect, concen-
tration of effect, and temporal immediacy (Jones 1991). He
argued that moral intensity is issue-specific and is not
dependent on the characteristics of the individual (such as
moral reasoning level) or the context (such as organiza-
tional culture or codes of conduct).
Jones (1991) spurred considerable additional empirical
research that has investigated the relative impact of the
dimensions of moral intensity on ethical decision making
(Weber 1996; Singhapadki et al. 1996; Marshall and Dewe
1997; Frey 2000; Chia and Mee 2000; Harrington 1997) as
well as the impact of moral intensity in the ethical decision
making process (Barnett and Valentine 2004; Carlson et al.
2002; Davis et al. 1998; Flannery and May 2000; Frey
2000; May and Pauli 2002; Morris and McDonald 1995;
Singer 1996), and the influence of individual and contex-
tual factors on moral intensity (Kelley and Elm 2003;
Lietsch 2004; Shaub 1997).
The results of this research have been informative, but
still somewhat inconsistent. Although, most of the studies
have found some relationship between moral intensity and
ethical decision making, Marshall and Dewe (1997)
determined that moral intensity does not have an impact on
ethical decision making. Even where other studies have
found a relationship between moral intensity and ethical
decision making, they have varied with regard to which
dimensions they have found significant and to what degree
(Singhapadki et al. 1996; Frey 2000; Barnett and Valentine
2004; May and Pauli 2002). May and Pauli (2002), for
example, determined that social consensus influences eth-
ical decision making, while Harrington (1997) determined
that it does not.
Contradictions can be attributed, at least in part, the
varying approaches adopted to addressing moral intensity.
The majority of studies have considered different combi-
nations of the six dimensions, with few studies considering
them all together.
Ethical Decision Frameworks
Normative studies of how moral frameworks influence
decision making comprise another stream of research
within the field of ethical decision making (i.e., Forsyth
1985; Brady and Wheeler 1996; Schminke et al. 1997;
Davis et al. 2001; Reynolds and Ceranic 2006). The results
are yet again mixed and somewhat inconsistent. Whereas,
DeConinck and Lewis (1997) found a preference for
deontological thinking, Rallapalli et al. (1998) and Kujala
(2001) found a preference for teleology. These sorts of
contradictions and differences can also be attributed to a
variety of differences in conceptualization of philosophical
theories and different empirical assessment techniques.
Physiological Models
Additional recent research has focused on the physiological
components of ethical decision making. For example,
Robertson et al. (2007) examined potentially different
neurological indicators of sensitivity to ethics of care and
justice using MRI technology. Haidt (2001) has suggested
that there is a moral center of the brain that engages when
individuals are faced with ethical issues based on the study
of Damasio and his colleagues. Damasio et al. (1990)
conducted a study on patients’ moral choices with damaged
sections of the ventromedial area of the prefrontal cortex.
Subjects with such damage demonstrated a loss of emo-
tional responsiveness to certain socially unacceptable pic-
tures (multilation, death, etc.) versus subjects who did not
have such damage to that area of the brain. This study has
suggested that there are specific linkages between brain
function and the existence of or lack of certain emotional
D. R. Elm, T. J. Radin
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responses that are encountered when faced with an ethical
issue.
Greene and colleagues have also explored neurological
implications of individuals’ responses to hypothetical
moral dilemmas. They utilized fMRI technology to assess
brain activity when subjects were given different types of
moral dilemmas. They found that individuals faced with
situations involving personal harm (close proximity to the
decision maker) produced greater activity in the emotion
related areas of the brain—the posterior cingulate cortex,
the amygdala, and the medial prefrontal cortex—than with
situations involving impersonal harm (great proximity
from the decision maker). They also suggest that individual
response to the dilemma is primarily emotional versus
reasoned (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and
Cohen 2001). In support of this, they found that individu-
als’ reaction times for responding to the dilemmas varied if
an emotional response had to be over-ridden to make a
certain choice in cases of personal harm (cognitive rea-
soning must overcome initial emotional response resulting
in a longer response time). This premise is consistent with
the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt
2001) which suggests reasoning is preceded by an intuitive
emotional response to ethical issues.
Meta-Analyses and Reviews
An additional category of research consists meta-analyses
and reviews—articles that endeavor to evaluate and orga-
nize existing research. Within business ethics, meta-anal-
ysis is generally promoted as an important technique
(Robertson 1993). There are nevertheless comparably few
meta-analyses (Brierley and Cowton 2000; Borkowski and
Ugras 1998; Franke et al. 1997) and literature reviews
(Moe et al. 2000; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005; Trevin˜o
et al. 2006) regarding ethical decision making.
A difficulty with such meta-analyses and reviews in
ethical decision making is that they compound the masking
of potentially flawed assumptions. By their nature, they
report inconsistent findings and emphasize different
approaches to the study of ethical decision making instead
of providing critical examinations of the field. For exam-
ple, O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) circumvented a por-
tion of the variability by limiting consideration of studies
by publication, keyword, and instrument. The result is that
their detailed, comprehensive analysis may not accurately
reflect the breadth of the field. On the other hand, Trevin˜o
et al. (2006) provide an extremely comprehensive review,
and attempt to suggest critical areas needing attention.
Their demarcation of the field of is considerably broader
than most prior understandings. Instead of naming journals
or keywords, they limited their research simply to ‘‘social
scientific works whose contributions to the field we per-
ceive to be substantial’’ (p. 952).
The magnitude of the field of ethical decision making
practically demands these sorts of meta-analyses and lit-
erature reviews. At this juncture, though, it is important to
consider not only what the field captures, but perhaps also
what is missing. In what is missing, we might find answers
to why certain inconsistencies and contradictions exist.
Research Design
To examine whether individuals make ethical decisions
differently than other types of decisions, we employed a
qualitative interview approach to identifying and analyzing
managers’ perceptions of difficult decisions. Each manager
identified characteristics of their decision making process
in four different types of situations:
(a) general decision making;
(b) difficult work-related decision making;
(c) difficult decision making related to ethics at work;
and
(d) difficult decision making not related to work.
From this data, grounded in managers’ actual experiences
and perceptions, new insights emerged regarding decision
making.
This study involved a sample of nine managers in the
Midwest from different work organizations. Examination
of their decision making processes resulted in approxi-
mately 100 data points for analysis. Potential subjects were
contacted through their enrollment in a part-time MBA
program. They were given a questionnaire to assess their
willingness to participate in the study, as well as to confirm
they currently held middle management positions at their
place of employment. Participants were chosen randomly
from the pool of MBA students who completed the initial
questionnaire. Participants were not notified in advance
regarding the true nature of the study to avoid potential
social desirability bias (Fernandes and Randall 1992;
Randall and Fernandes 1991).
Seven of the subjects were male, two were female. All
were middle managers at various business organizations.
The organizations ranged in size and industry from a
nursing home to a large financial institution. The average
age of manager was 31 years (range was 27–39); five
individuals had worked at their organization for more than
5 years. One researcher interviewed all nine subjects.
The interview protocol was designed to encourage
subjects to begin with basic background information. They
were then asked to provide information about their general,
every-day decision making processes at work. The inter-
view then progressed through separate questions about
Ethical Decision Making
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difficult decisions at work and ethical decisions at work.
The interview concluded with questions about the subject’s
process of making decisions not related to work. Subjects
were asked to compare how they made decisions at work
versus not at work (see Appendix Table 6 for description of
interview questions). The interview questions were not
varied to provide a continuous stream of description of the
process used to make decisions; from daily or less signif-
icant, to potentially larger, more difficult decisions, and
finally to decisions about an ethical issue. The logic was
that keeping the ethical decision process description near
the end of the interview would minimize the potential for
self-improvement social desirability bias (Fernandes and
Randall 1992). Our objective was to support prior research
while allowing room for new issues to emerge. This sort of
interplay among experience, induction, and deduction
plays an important role in this type of research according to
Glazer and Strauss (1967).
Recordings of the interviews were then developed into
transcripts which constituted the data for the study. The
transcripts were randomized and subsequently identified
only by subject number during the coding process. Data
analysis was conducted through an inductive research design
(Glazer and Strauss 1967; Boyatzis 1998; Locke 2001). In
such a design, researchers gather data and examine it to
determine theoretical patterns and themes. While we were
not specifically looking to create new theory, but to examine
the information obtained about the subjects decision making
processes, we utilized thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998) in
the evaluation of the interview transcripts.
Step 1
We analyzed data through a three-phase content analysis
procedure (e.g., Glazer and Strauss 1967) (as described in
part in Appendix Table 7). The first step was the most
intensive portion of this process. It involved reading tran-
scripts and outlining their content to isolate themes. As part
of this phase, the transcripts were broken down into
‘‘thought units’’ which ranged from words to phrases to
complete sentences. The goal was to identify and capture
entire thoughts. The only material excluded was that which
translated into ‘‘small talk,’’ such as discussion of family
circumstances. Virtually all statements were therefore
integrated into the coding scheme.
The coding scheme was developed according to Boy-
atzis (1998) by sampling the thought units in the transcripts
and conducting thematic analysis. Through thematic anal-
ysis, a small sample of the transcripts was examined for
potential sub-samples of responses (for example, those who
used one process to make decisions vs. those who used
another) and to identify general themes that consistently
appeared throughout the subject responses. For this study,
since the study sample size was not large, the small sample
was four transcripts. This represents the recommended
percentage of subjects necessary for initial theme devel-
opment (Boyatzis 1998). After refining the definitions and
labels of the sub-samples and themes that consistently
appeared for clarity and parsimony, a coding scheme was
created that integrated the themes. The code was comprised
predominantly of themes with category items that deman-
ded binary responses to show clear presence or absence in a
subject’s response. Appendix Table 8 contains the coding
scheme used in this study.
Step 2
The second step involved coding the data according to the
identified categories. Two researchers independently coded
the data and then compared results to determine inter-rater
reliability. Before measuring agreement, however, we
identified areas of agreement and disagreement. Because,
we believed that this phase had the greatest impact on our
findings, we discussed differences, which we resolved
through a repetitive iterative process that involved reaf-
firming that the data corresponded to the categories, debate,
and reformulation. Once satisfied that our coding scheme
captured reflected the data, we then revised the categori-
zation and recoded. We calculated inter-rater agreement
according to the relatively conservative P statistic. This
technique entailed dividing the total number of coded items
for which the two raters agreed by the total number of
coded items, which resulted in overall inter-rater agree-
ment of 83.3%. Such high inter-rater agreement suggests
that the emergent categories fit the data.
Step 3
In the third phase, the coded data was reviewed and ana-
lyzed to determine patterns among the subjects in the
context of the identified categories. Responses by the pri-
mary researcher were used where there was disagreement
between the researchers. Comments by individual subjects
were compared both within and across categories. We
looked for similarities in how different subjects treated the
same types of decisions and in how single subjects treated
different types of decisions. We then compared answers to
the short answer evaluations obtained during the coding
process to distinguish between elements of the decision
making process and key drivers.
Results
The key question driving this research was, ‘‘Is there a
meaningful distinction in how individuals make ethical
D. R. Elm, T. J. Radin
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decisions versus other types of decisions?’’ Analysis of the
interviews yielded 103 pieces of nominal data for each
subject, which all contained binary (yes/no) responses. The
data was organized into four themes for each type of
decision, and the categories that represented those themes.
The categories of data pertained to the nature of the
information were collected. Of the questions, 19 had to do
with specific influences on the decision making process; 3
had to do with the method of communicating some of that
information; and 5 had to do with the nature of the deci-
sions. The primary focus of the research had to do with the
information relating to specific influences on the decision
making process. That data was organized thematically
according to the type of influence:
(a) objective information;
(b) subjective information;
(c) information about consequences; and
(d) information about motivation.
Any relationship between these themes and moral phi-
losophy was unanticipated and resulted from the subjects’
own responses, not by our design. Whereas, other
researchers have intentionally sought out a relationship
between decision making and moral philosophy (i.e., De-
Coninck and Lewis 1997; Rallapalli et al. 1998; Kujala
2001; Douglas et al. 2001; Reynolds 2006), this was not
our intent. Our discussion of themes and categories is
intended to underscore key findings, particularly as they
pertain to existing ethical decision making research and
theoretical assumptions.
Table 1 includes theme names, category names, and
examples from subject responses of each category; while
Table 2 includes the frequencies with which the categories
were present across all subjects’ responses.
This significance is not in the categories themselves but
in the frequency of the categories as they appeared in the
decision making of the subjects.
Types of Decision Making Across Subjects
An analysis of the frequencies reveals the presence—and
the absence—of certain patterns. If ethical decision making
is meaningful different from other types of decision mak-
ing, we might expect that a pattern would have emerged
showing different types of factors influencing ethical
decision making as compared with other types of decision
making. What is missing in the data is such a clear, dis-
cernable, pattern that distinguishes ethical decision making
from other types of decision making.
Table 2 shows the frequency at which particular factors
influenced decision making by the subjects. The subjects
employed a variety of factors and methods of communi-
cation during the decision making process. In fact,
objective information such as data affected decision mak-
ing comparably in all types of decision making. The boxed
frequencies are those that fell outside of one standard
deviation of the average number of times a factor was
influential for each separate type of decision making. With
regard to the rest of the data, each type of decision making
varied significantly with regard to different factors, with
daily decision making appearing somewhat neutral. This
appears to show that the specific factors vary by decision,
not necessarily decision type. It is possible, if not likely,
that some of the differences can also be explained by how
we separated the data. The decision maker and his or her
family could be considered stakeholders. The organization
and finances could also similarly be considered together.
Such changes have an effect on the frequencies.
Another way to consider the data is by thematic category.
Table 3 shows the number of times any sort of data within a
thematic category affected decision making, regardless of
how many different types were used. The boxed entries
represent frequencies outside one standard deviation of the
average of times a category was used for decision making.
This reveals predominant consistency among the different
types of decision making with only a handful of exceptions.
Many of these exceptions are logical. For example, when
talking about daily decision making, it seems likely that
consequences were not discussed more consistently because
of the more incidental nature of the decision and the
potential lack of relevant stakeholders.
While analyzing frequencies by type of decision does
not provide conclusive information, it does suggest that
ethical decision making might not be different from other
types of decision making. At the very least, there is cause
to question that assumption.
Decisions Within Subjects
Analysis of frequencies indicates that greater consistency
exists in how a single individual makes decisions than in how
different individuals make the same sorts of decisions.
Table 4 contains the frequencies of how often a particular
factor influenced a subject making each of the 4 types of
decisions. Patterns emerge within the decision making of
individual subjects. The data suggests that a relationship
exists within a single individual in his or her decision making
without regard to different types of decisions (i.e., daily,
difficult, ethical, and not related to work). All of the subjects
displayed some degree of consistency in their behavior irre-
spective of the type of the decision being confronted. Con-
sistency, for our purposes, was defined as a frequency of 3 or
greater with regard to a particular category. In other words, if
the data supports a subject having been influenced by a par-
ticular factor in at least 3 of the 4 types of decisions, he or she
was considered consistent with regard to that category.
Ethical Decision Making
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Although, none of the subjects were completely con-
sistent, all were consistent with regard to at least one factor.
The factors considered consistent according to our criterion
are boxed on Table 4. For example, 5 of the subjects (#2,
#4, #7, #8, and #9) demonstrated consistency (frequency of
at least 3) in their reliance on data, research and informa-
tion gathering. Similarly, subject #3 was consistent with
regard to his consideration of consequences such as impact
on finances and the organization, as subject #8 was
consistent with regard to consideration of impact on self
and family, consequences to the organization, and general
costs and benefits analysis.
Consideration of thematic groups, as presented in
Table 5, provides even stronger indications of the consis-
tencies that characterize individual decision making. In this
table, ‘‘1’’ was noted every time a decision maker was
affected by any of the specific categories within the broad
thematic category, without regard for how many categories
Table 1 Themes and categories derived from interviews
Theme/categories Subject Example
Objective information
Data/facts/research/information
gathering
# 8 ‘‘Just gathering all your information so that you can decide how to resolve something’’
Past experience # 3 ‘‘It’s always based for me on what’s happened in the past’’
Regulations/rules/policies/laws # 3 ‘‘Make that one of our criteria? That’s kind of where we’re leaning at this point’’
Subjective information
Gut feel/intuition/personal
preferences/emotions
# 6 ‘‘My decisions, typically, I just have to make them. If I want to do something, I just have to make
that decision happen’’
Concern for personal
relationships
# 1 ‘‘I felt like a mentor to this person. And I had wanted her to succeed and it may have been that she
was giving up on me as she was leaving as opposed to was this right for her in her life right
now’’
Input from family/friends # 5 ‘‘I relied a lot on my wife, even… I think that we serve as a good sounding board for each other’’
Input from supervisors # 1 ‘‘Right after I had the first conversation with her, I emailed my boss’’
Input from peers/colleagues # 2 ‘‘I’ll consult with other professionals—my peers’’
Input from subordinates # 7 ‘‘I always like to go last because I don’t want any of my opinions to influence anyone else in the
room’’
Input from involved parties # 4 ‘‘I would go and talk to the different people involved’’
Consequences
Impact on self/family # 8 ‘‘Whereas I could make it a little more difficult on myself and the people that are actually here
and either maintain or cut back and help out everyone else’’
Impact on stakeholders # 9 ‘‘I won’t ever cross the line based on the severity of what could happen to the patient—that’s
where I don’t cross the line’’
Impact on finances # 6 ‘‘We had to go back to the sister company say, ‘Listen, we can’t eat this bill of $120,000. We
have to figure out a different way to go about this,’’ knowing, on the flip-side that they had to
make money—they’re judged on profitability as well’’
Impact on organization # 4 ‘‘You have to help people come to an agreement that they are working for the good of the team,
because there’s optimization only at the highest level and at lower levels they need to be aware
of what other design teams are doing so that they’re working together’’
General costs/benefits/risks # 7 ‘‘It’s difficult for me then to make the decision and say, ‘No we’re going to keep looking.’ You
see lost profits, you see unhappy customers, you see work that’s piling up—you want make a
decision. The decision not to decide was the challenging portion of this for me’’
Motivation
Consistency (procedural) # 3 ‘‘That’s where it goes back to; I do the same for anybody’’
Resolve # 2 ‘‘I need to stay hard and fast because I knew what I needed to make this office successful’’
Productivity # 9 ‘‘Albeit we identified a technology, we weren’t too quick in saying it was successful’’
Fairness (substantive) # 5 ‘‘I need to allow her that time to take care of what I view as what is important to her health and
happiness and working for the company’’
Communication
Impersonal # 1 ‘‘I emailed Debbie (my boss) and said, ‘Here’s what I’ve got going on’’’
Personal # 2 ‘‘I would rather talk face-to-face, one-on-one’’
Group # 9 ‘‘So we had the meeting’’’’
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were considered. The results show that, while decision
makers are somewhat consistent with regard to specific
factors, they are more consistent with regard to broader
thematic categories. The boxed values in Table 5 represent
the total number of times the thematic category was used
across all 4 decision types. Subjects #1 and #4, for example,
consistently rely on both subjective and objective infor-
mation and are motivated by consideration of principles, but
do not tend to rely on consideration of consequences.
Subjects #5, #7, #8, and #9, on the other hand, consistently
integrate all types of factors in their decision making.
Qualitative Analysis
The numerical analysis of the data represents a starting
point—only one dimension of the results—also compli-
mented by significant qualitative analysis. While the cod-
ing meaningfully identifies themes that spanned the deci-
sion making of the subjects, it does not capture the degree
to which the subjects relied on those factors. Subject #1 is
someone who relies heavily on intuition in all types of
decisions more than on anything else. With regard to daily
decision making, for example, she stated, ‘‘I go based on
my knowledge, gut feeling, kind of what I feel the situation
is like, and I make the decision.’’ As she recalled the dif-
ficult and ethical decisions she confronted, she similarly
responded similarly by intuition and gut feel. While she
ended up incorporating other information as well, it
appeared from the conversation that she was merely con-
firming the decisions she was already prepared to make.
Subject #2, on the other hand, relies heavily on the sub-
jective information she receives from other people. She
Table 2 Frequencies by
decision type
Frequencies by Decision Type 
Daily Decision 
Making 
Difficult 
Decisions 
Ethical 
Decisions 
Decisions Not 
Work-Related 
OBJECTIVE 
7667ataD
132ecneirepxetsaP 4 
1snoitalugeR 7 4 0 
SUBJECTIVE 
423leeftuG 6 
2 
3 
3 1 0 
6 1 1 
2 1 0 
Personal Relationships 0 1 0
Opinions - Family / friends 0 1 0
Opinions - Supervisors 0
Opinions - Peers / colleagues 2
Opinions - Subordinates 0
Opinions - Involved parties 2 6 2 1 
CONSEQUENCES 
341ylimaf/fleS 6 
32sredlohekatS 6 0 
1secnaniF 3 1 1 
673noitazinagrO 0 
1stifeneb/stsoC 7 3 2 
MOTIVATION 
0 
10evloseR 2 0 
2ytivitcudorP 6 4 1 
6 0 
COMMUNICATION 
1lanosrepmI 5 2 4 
7 6 4 
Consistency (Procedural) 2 3 2
Fairness (Substantive) 0 1
Personal (face-to-face) 5 
Group (i.e., meetings) 3 4 1 0 
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states from the outset with regard to daily decision making,
‘‘What I’ll do is send an email or a voice message to
whomever I need to get more information from.’’ She reit-
erates the importance of communication when discussing the
difficult decision she confronted. ‘‘I’d rather have the verbal
connection because there’s so much that’s said verbally and
non-verbally when I’m meeting with somebody one-on-
one,’’ she explained. And when confronting the ethical issue,
the first thing she did was to talk to her manager.
This sort of consistency also presented itself with sub-
ject #4. From the start he emphasizes ‘‘the’’ answer—as if
there is ‘‘a’’ right answer for any decision that needs to be
made. In reference to a difficult decision, he called his
process ‘‘systematic’’ because it is ‘‘more if you ask the
right people and if you ask the right questions, the deci-
sion pretty much is an analytical decision, black and
white.’’ He said that he did not confront ethical decisions,
apparently because ethics involves the absence of ‘‘right’’
answers and he sees the world as if there always is a
‘‘right’’ answer.
These are merely some of the examples that emerged from
evaluation of our sample. While the numerical analysis
reveals some consistency, qualitative analysis reveals even
more. The point, however, is not to show conclusively that
decision making varies by individual and not by type of
decision, but to provoke further examination of the research
question: ‘‘Does decision making vary by type?’’ ‘‘Is there
anything special or different about ethical decision
making?’’
The consequences of the answering these sorts of
questions should not be under valued. If decision making
does vary by type and ethical decision making can be
viewed separately, then considerable support is given for
existing research. If, however, that assumption is invalid, it
suggests a reason for inconsistencies and contradictions in
the existing research and opens up a new area to study.
Limitations
Although, researchers continue to debate the strengths and
weaknesses of qualitative research, the popularity of
inductive research continues to increase (Scott 2000). This
does not negate the limitations of the methodology. Even
with high inter-rater agreement, there remains a large
degree of bias inherit in the process. All conclusions are
filtered through the subjectivity of the researchers. Data is
also potentially distorted by factors such as information
recall and attributional bias. Such information is actually
relevant to our findings in that we are measuring not only
reality but also perceptions of that reality.
The small size and relative homogeneity of the sample is an
obvious and significant limitation to the study in that it
restricts the types of conclusions we are able to make. For this
study, however, we intentionally traded quantity for quality,
for our objective was not necessarily to draw conclusions
about decision making. Instead of conducting broad analysis,
our focus lay on conducting deeper analysis to determine if
there are initial indications that can be used to further our
study of decision making about ethical issues. Our analyses
did not note any significant differences between the men and
women in the study, but the results we obtained must be
examined through that lens. However, although there are only
nine participants, the amount of analyzable data is more than
one per subject. Each single subject resulted in more than a
hundred pieces of data for us to analyze.
The nature of the coding process itself proved to be a
limitation of this research for it caused us to organize data
quantitatively without regard for qualitative differences.
We responded to this limitation by including an additional
set of short answer questions that assisted us in making
qualitative distinctions. The coding scheme enabled us to
evaluate the types of information that influence decision
making; the short answer questions enabled us to evaluate
Table 3 Frequencies by
decision type
Frequencies by Decision Type 
Daily Decision 
Making 
Difficult 
Decisions 
Ethical 
Decisions 
Decisions Not 
Work-Related 
OBJECTIVE 8 8 8 8 
SUBJECTIVE 5 9 5 8 
CONSEQUENCES 4 9 8 8 
MOTIVATION 3 8 8 1 
COMMUNICATION 6 9 6 5 
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Table 4 Frequencies by subject
1 = Daily Process (at work) 
2 = Difficult Decision (at work) 
3 = Ethical Decision (at work) 
4 = Decision not at work 
Subject #1 Subject #2 Subject #3 Subject #4 Subject #5 
1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   
OBJECTIVE     0           0     0           0     0 
    Data 1 1     2 1 1 1 1   4 1 1   2 1 1   1   3 1 1   2 
    Past experience     0           0 1 1 1   3   1   1   2 1 1   2 
    Regulations 1 1     2   1 1     2 1 1 1     3   1       1 1 1     2 
SUBJECTIVE     0           0     0           0     0 
    Gut feel 1 1     2     1     1     0       1   1 1     1 
    Personal relationships     0           0 1     1           0 1   1 
        Family / friends 1   1           0     0       1   1 1 1   2 
        Supervisors 1     1   1 1     2     0           0     0 
        Peers / colleagues 1 1     2   1       1 1   1   1       1 1     1 
        Subordinates     0           0     0           0 1     1 
        Involved parties 1     1           0     0 1 1       2 1 1 1   3 
CONSEQUENCES     0           0     0           0     0 
    Self / family 1     1     1     1 1 1     2       1   1 1   1 
    Stakeholders     0     1     1 1 1 1     3   1       1 1     1 
    Finances     0           0 1 1 1 1   4           0     0 
    Organization 1 1     2 1 1 1     3     0           0 1 1     2 
    Costs / benefits     0   1   1   2     0   1       1 1     1 
MOTIVATION     0           0     0           0     0 
    Consistency (Procedural) 1   1           0     0       1   1 1 1   2 
    Resolve 1     1   1 1     2     0           0     0 
    Productivity 1 1     2   1       1 1   1   1       1 1     1 
    Fairness (Substantive)     0           0     0           0 1     1 
COMMUNICATION     0           0     0           0     0 
    Impersonal 1 1 1   3 1 1   1   3 1 1     2       1   1 1   1 
    Personal (face-to-face) 1 1 1     3 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1   3 1 1   1   3 1 1 1   3 
    Group (i.e., meetings) 1     1           0     0 1 1       2     0 
Frequencies by Subject 
Subject #6 Subject #7 Subject #8 Subject #9 
1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   
OBJECTIVE           0     0           0     0 
    Data           0 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1 1   4 
    Past experience     1 1   2 1     1           0 1     1 
    Regulations           0     0   1       1 1     1 
SUBJECTIVE           0     0           0     0 
    Gut feel 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1   3       1   1 1 1   2 
    Personal relationships       1   1     0           0     0 
        Family / friends           0     0           0     0 
        Supervisors           0 1     1           0     0 
        Peers / colleagues           0 1     1   1       1 1     1 
        Subordinates           0 1 1     2           0     0 
        Involved parties 1 1       2 1     1           0 1     1 
CONSEQUENCES           0     0           0     0 
    Self / family       1   1 1 1   2   1 1 1   3 1 1   2 
    Stakeholders           0 1 1     2           0 1     1 
    Finances   1       1 1     1           0     0 
    Organization   1 1     2 1     1 1 1 1     3 1     1 
    Costs / benefits   1       1 1 1     2 1 1 1     3 1 1 1   3 
MOTIVATION           0     0           0     0 
    Consistency (Procedural)           0     0           0     0 
    Resolve           0 1     1           0     0 
    Productivity           0 1     1   1       1 1     1 
    Fairness (Substantive)           0 1 1     2           0     0 
COMMUNICATION           0     0           0     0 
    Impersonal   1       1     0   1       1     0 
    Personal (face-to-face)   1 1     2 1 1 1     3   1       1 1 1     2 
    Group (i.e., meetings)   1       1 1     1 1         1 1     1 
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the types of information that are most influential to par-
ticular decision makers.
The types of decisions the subjects discussed and the
degree to which they were willing to discuss them (partic-
ularly with regard to the decisions not related to work) also
served as an inherent limitation. In particular, we allowed
the subjects to define an ethical decision rather than provide
guidelines regarding what that type of decision might entail.
While there are advantages to having subjects discuss actual
situations (as opposed to hypothetical scenarios), it is pos-
sible that additional guidelines could assist respondents in
providing more useful responses and clearer distinctions
between ethical and difficult decisions.
A final limitation of the study is that the interviews of
subjects were conducted by one researcher. Although, this
could be considered a bias inherent in the accumulation of
the data, it also provides a consistency that might not have
been possible with multiple researchers conducting the
interviews—even with structured questions.
Discussion
By gathering data without any sort of a prior theoretical
framework, we undertook this study to help us understand
why inconsistencies and contradictions exist throughout
Table 5 Frequencies by
Subject by thematic category
Frequencies by Subject by Thematic Category 
1 = Daily Process (at work) 
2 = Difficult Decision (at work) 
3 = Ethical Decision (at work) 
4 = Decision not at work 
Subject #1 Subject #2 Subject #3 
1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   
OBJECTIVE 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1 1   4 
SUBJECTIVE 1 1 1 1   4   1 1     2 1 1   2 
CONSEQUENCES 1 1     2 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1 1   4 
MOTIVATION 1 1 1 1   4   1 1     2 1   1 
COMMUNICATION 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1   3 
Subject #4 Subject #5 Subject #6 
1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   
OBJECTIVE 1 1   1   3 1 1 1 1   4     1 1   2 
SUBJECTIVE 1 1   1   3 1 1 1   3 1 1 1 1   4 
CONSEQUENCES   1   1   2 1 1 1   3   1 1 1   3 
MOTIVATION 1 1   1   3 1 1 1   3   1 1     2 
COMMUNICATION 1 1   1   3 1 1 1   3   1 1     2 
Subject #7 Subject #8 Subject #9 
1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4   
OBJECTIVE 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1 1   4 
SUBJECTIVE 1 1 1 1   4 1 1   1   3 1 1 1   3 
CONSEQUENCES 1 1 1   3 1 1 1 1   4 1 1 1   3 
MOTIVATION 1 1 1 3 1 1 1     3 1 1 1 3 
COMMUNICATION 1 1 1 3 1 1       2 1 1     2 
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existing ethical decision making research. Our results
suggest, contrary to common assumptions, that there may
be no real distinction between ethical decision making
processes and other types of decision making.
This perspective—that ethical decision making is not
special—has been argued in both moral philosophy and
social science. Messick and Bazerman (1996) asserted that
the decision making psychology of Kahneman and Tversky
(Kahneman 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1986) regarding
risk aversion and gain seeking behavior was applicable to
ethical decisions made by executives. They argued that
unethical decisions are essentially ‘‘bad’’ decisions, since
they do not take into account the typical decision making
biases that tend to affect all humans. More recently, Gino
et al. (2008) conducted two studies examining the appli-
cation of outcome bias in decision making psychology for
ethical decisions. Outcome bias in decision making psy-
chology suggests that the quality of a decision will be
determined, cetabus paribus, by the consequences of the
decision. Gino et al. found that outcome bias does apply to
ethical decisions as it applies to other types of decision
making. Their studies demonstrate that the judgment of the
ethicality of questionable actions is based on whether the
action is followed by negative or positive consequences;
that is, a decision maker is judged to be more ethical if the
consequences that follow the decision are positive and
judged to be less ethical if the consequences are negative,
regardless of whether the consequences are within the
control of the decision maker. They suggest that their
findings present a potential challenge to teleological moral
theories since consequences can affect the determination of
whether or not a judgment is ethical.
Haidt’s study in moral psychology also lends itself to a
consideration that while moral judgments might be more
intuitively driven than rationally driven, such judgments are
not different from other types of judgments (Haidt 2001,
2007). In addition, the recent study of Greene (2011) has
suggested that there are particular areas of brain activity that
could be linked to teleological or deontological moral rea-
soning processes. Our results demonstrate consistency within
individuals regarding how they make decisions—ethical or
not—but this could be linked to a particular brain activity that
supports a preference for reasoning type. More research in this
area could be beneficial to the examination of how individuals
make complex decisions, including ethical ones.
In the field of philosophy, Crary (2007) has recently
argued that an individual’s thinking expresses his or her
moral outlook, and that such thinking will be central to all
topics—not only to those we might consider moral. She
suggests that moral thinking is indifferent to subject matter,
but is a thought process that must engage the entire person’s
thinking and reasoning. There is, therefore, no separation
between moral reasoning and other types of reasoning. She
goes further to argue that there is no separate moral lan-
guage, but that, in fact, all language is moral language:
Since, on the terms of this view, all moral thought
without regard to form is essentially concerned with
expressing individual moral outlooks, and since on its
terms, a person’s moral outlook is taken to be by a
sensibility internal to all of her linguistic capacities, it
follows that the view might be described as one on
which ethics is concerned as distinguished by a pre-
occupation not with judgments in one region of lan-
guage but with a dimension of all language [emphasis
added] (Crary 2007, pp. 46–47).
Hauser (2006) echoes this perspective in his argument
that all humans share a sort of ‘‘moral grammar,’’ an ethical
equivalent to the basic grasp of speech that most linguists
believe is with us from birth. This reference to a connection
between morality and language exists in the ethical decision
making literature as well (i.e., Butterfield et al. 2000). The
presence of a shared ‘‘moral grammar’’ indicates that moral
language and decision processes cross topics and issues
such that there is no meaningful distinction between ethical
decision making and other types of decision making.
In business ethics, Palazzo et al. (2008) have connected
ethical decision making to an examination of the use of
decision making schema. This research suggests that the
widely held perspective that ethical decision making is a
rational process is incorrect, and that, in fact, individuals
make ethical decisions according to a combination of their
cognitive schema and the situation in which they are
immersed. By matching certain strong or weak schema
with strong or weak situations, different ethical decisions
result. They argue that ‘‘ethical blindness’’ occurs when
there is a mismatch between an individual’s schema and
the situation. Ethical blindness is, therefore, the absence of
a perception of the moral dimension of an issue.
Other studies by Trevin˜o et al. (1998) and Bird (1996)
have examined the influence of linguistic practices on
ethical decision making in organizations. Trevino noted
that more openness in discussing ethical issues was related
to more ethical behavior; and Bird found that lack of eth-
ical language, or ‘‘moral muteness’’ in organizations con-
tributed to more instances of unethical behavior. Trevin˜o
et al. (2006) suggest that this may be related to the role of
language in creating cognitive schemas that affect moral
awareness and moral decision making.
Our results, although clearly preliminary, support the
view that there may not be a separation between ethical
decision making and other types of decision making. This
means that the field of ethical decision making as it exists
among the social scientists may be impoverished by not
being connected to research on decision making in gen-
eral. This realization could account for many of the
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inconsistencies and contradictions in existing research
since that research is incomplete—it is possibly distorted
by its focus on one type of decision making.
It is also possible that our study has elucidated another
potential avenue for research in ethical decision making—
that individuals do not perceive that ethical decision
making is different from other types of decision making. It
is possible that we actually accumulated data on how these
individuals perceive their own decision making, since the
study involved self reporting and we allowed the subjects
to decide what an ethical decision was. If this is the case,
further research would be useful to determine if the per-
ception is related to the actual process. Some of the more
recent studies of the potential relationship between physi-
ological brain activity and decision making processes could
be helpful here, since, we want to understand how people
make decisions with ethical implications.
Our research is a beginning, not an end. Our findings are
not intended as conclusive, but as an impetus for more
quantitative and qualitative inquiries into the question of
whether or not ethical decision making is different from
other types of decision making.
Appendix
See Tables 6, 7, and 8.
Table 6 Interview question format
1. Please tell me a little bit about your background:
Age
Education
How long you have been with this company
Other employment experience
2. Could you tell me about the steps or process you typically use to
make decisions on a daily basis?
3. Let’s talk about a specific decision in some depth. Can you tell
me about a decision that was particularly difficult for you to
make at work in the past year? Describe the issue
4. What made this decision difficult for you?
5. What did you do to make the decision?
6. Can you describe the steps you took?
7. What most influenced or helped you to make this decision? Did
you talk with others about this or use other resources?
8. How long did this process take?
9. Would you do anything differently if this came up again?
10. Have you had to make any difficult ethical decisions? Can you
tell me about the process you used for that? Questions 4–9
again
11. Do you use the same process/steps to make decisions when you
are not at work (not in your professional role)?
Table 7 Inductive coding scheme development (thematic analysis,
Boyatzis 1998)
1. Randomly number subjects and remove names from transcripts.
Record pertinent information in records. Make transcripts blind
2. Read through transcripts and create outline for each subject on
each question. Create sub-samples here (e.g., those who
recognized ethical decision and those who did not)
3. Use outlines to identify themes in each sub-group of subject
responses. Specific definition isn’t necessary here, just any
glimmer of themes
4. Re-write themes that are consistent across subjects in sub-
sample; possible labels may come up here
5. Themes that show distinctions between sub-samples are re-
written again for clarity and parsimony. Re-read original
transcripts—each theme should clearly be either present or
absent
6. Develop the code: Assign a label to each theme; define it
clearly; record indicators ‘‘Coded when subject stated abc…’’ or
‘‘xyz…’’; note differentiation in each subject (NOT sub-sample,
but all subjects)—i.e., subjects 1 and 5 showed theme, subjects
2, 3, 4, 8 did not show theme
7. Technically, the sub-samples should not be the whole sample,
because then after the code is developed, return to the original
sample and code remaining subjects blind
8. Have a colleague code the sample and compare code differences
for reliability
Table 8 Coding scheme
Pieces of information that influenced the decision making process was
treated as data. Three types of data were collected. (1) Data about the
type or nature of the decision; (2) data about information that influenced
the decision; and (3) data about the manner in which information
influential to the decision was communicated by others
(1) Type of decision
‘‘Type of decision’’ refers to the nature of the decision—i.e., to the
functional area of the business to which the decision pertains
Financial decision/
business challenge
Primarily financial in nature, where
the focus lies on cost-related issues
Human decision Linked to individuals in their work
capacity—i.e., hiring, firing, and
transfers
Conflict of stakeholder
interests
Pertains to situations linked to direct
stakeholder conflicts
Operations/systems/
technology
Deals with choices about
infrastructure or technological
offerings
Policy
implementation/
enforcement
Concerns situations where the
emphasis is on systemization and
standardization not necessarily
linked to core products or services
(2a) Objective information
‘‘Objective information’’ refers to information that, regardless of the
sources, is perceived as unbiased and factual in nature
Data/facts/research/
information
gathering
Specific references to data, facts,
and so on; a number of respondents
emphasized actively seeking out
information
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